There is a moment in every security program when someone suggests buying a threat intelligence feed. It sounds responsible. The vendors promise curated indicators, actor tracking, and early warning. The budget gets approved. The feed arrives. And then, quietly, it becomes another dashboard nobody looks at.
The problem is not that threat intelligence is useless. The problem is that most feeds are built for a generic audience, and most organizations have specific needs. A feed full of indicators related to a nation-state actor targeting defense contractors is not particularly useful to a regional hospital. A feed focused on financial fraud is not useful to a software company. Relevance is everything, and relevance is not something a vendor can guess.
Before subscribing to anything, it helps to write down what you actually want to know. What industries are most likely to be targeted by the threats you care about? What kinds of assets do you have that would be attractive to an attacker? What has happened to peer organizations in the past year? The answers to those questions should shape what you collect, not the other way around.
It also helps to distinguish between different types of intelligence. Strategic intelligence tells you about trends and actors. It shapes long-term planning. Operational intelligence tells you about campaigns and techniques. It shapes detection priorities. Tactical intelligence gives you specific indicators. It shapes blocking rules. These are different products with different audiences, and mixing them into one feed usually produces something that serves nobody well.
Collection is the easy part. The hard part is triage. A feed with ten thousand indicators a day is not useful unless you can score them, enrich them, and decide which ones deserve action. Most organizations need a process, not more data. That process might be as simple as a weekly review where a small team examines new indicators and decides which ones map to real risks.
The most common mistake with threat intelligence is treating it as a checkbox. The feed is purchased, the integration is configured, and then it is never evaluated again. A better approach is to ask, periodically, what decisions the feed has changed. Did it lead to a new detection rule? Did it prevent an incident? Did it inform a risk assessment? If the answer is no, the feed is not earning its place.
It is also worth being honest about what you cannot do. If you do not have the staff to review indicators, a large feed will not help. If you do not have the logging to act on the intelligence you receive, the intelligence is theoretical. Capability and intelligence need to grow together. Buying one without the other rarely produces the outcome anyone wants.
The organizations that get the most from threat intelligence tend to be the ones that start small. A handful of trusted sources. A clear set of questions. A regular review process. Over time, they add sources as their ability to consume them grows. It is not glamorous, but it is how intelligence turns into something that actually protects the business.
This incident opened my eyes to the value of Insurance in general, so I decided to examine my personal and business insurance.
Comment (3)
The payments are made directly from one person to another without passing through a central bank or clearing house.
22 feb,2025
ReplyThe Slow Bleed of Credential Stuffing Attacks
23 feb,2025
ReplyWhen Your Threat Feed Is Mostly Noise
23 feb,2025
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